2026 East Africa Capital Markets Report

Important Notices

This publication has been prepared by Murivest Research Team. Murivest Group for informational purposes only. It does not constitute an offer, solicitation, or recommendation to buy or sell any security, property, or financial instrument. The information contained herein is derived from sources believed to be reliable, but Murivest makes no representation or warranty as to its accuracy or completeness.

All expressions of opinion are subject to change without notice. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Any investment in commercial real estate involves risk, including possible loss of principal. Readers should conduct their own independent due diligence and consult with appropriate legal, tax, and financial advisors before making any investment decision.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The 2026 Investment Thesis

East African commercial real estate is entering a phase that rewards selectivity over accumulation. The era in which capital could be deployed indiscriminately across land, buildings, and development projects—confident that headline appreciation would compensate for weak income, poor tenant covenants, or opaque ownership—is receding. In its place, a more discriminating market is emerging: one in which income quality, tenant covenant, location scarcity, lease duration, liquidity, and downside protection matter more than the simple fact of property ownership.

This transition is neither complete nor uniform. It is most visible in Nairobi, where prime Grade A office occupancy has recovered to approximately 81.6 percent, rents have stabilised at roughly US$13 per square metre per month, and demand is concentrating in buildings that offer institutional-grade specifications, credible ESG credentials, and flexible lease structures. It is less visible in secondary office stock, in speculative residential development, and in retail formats that have not adapted to changing consumer behaviour. The market is bifurcating, and capital that fails to recognise this bifurcation risks owning assets that appreciate slowly while generating inadequate income.

The macroeconomic backdrop is supportive but not without tension. Kenya's real GDP growth accelerated to 5.3 percent in the first quarter of 2026, up from 4.0 percent in the preceding quarter. The Central Bank of Kenya has held its benchmark rate at 8.75 percent since February 2026, following an aggressive easing cycle that removed 425 basis points between August 2024 and February 2026. Inflation, at 6.5 percent in July 2026, remains within the central bank's target band of 2.5 to 7.5 percent, though it sits above the 5.0 percent midpoint. Foreign direct investment reached a record USD 3.2 billion in 2025, up 37.7 percent from the prior year. These conditions provide a reasonable foundation for real estate investment, but they do not eliminate risk.

The most significant near-term risk factor is the August 2027 Kenyan General Election. Historical evidence demonstrates that election cycles can influence economic activity, investor sentiment, capital flows, and real estate transaction velocity. The 2007–08 cycle produced the most severe disruption, with real GDP growth collapsing from 6.9 percent to 0.2 percent. The 2013, 2017, and 2022 cycles produced more modest effects, though the 2017–18 period was marked by prolonged uncertainty that weakened private-sector credit growth and business activity. Kenya enters the 2027 cycle from a position of relative resilience—growth is positive, FDI is strong, and the shilling has stabilised near Kshs 129 to the US dollar—but fiscal pressures remain acute, with public debt at Kshs 13.0 trillion and a projected fiscal deficit of Kshs 1.1 trillion in FY2026/27.

For institutional capital, the election introduces a strategic dilemma. Waiting may reduce political uncertainty but simultaneously increase opportunity cost. A buyer who delays until after August 2027 may gain greater political visibility but potentially lose attractive pricing, scarce assets, motivated sellers, and competitive positioning. The question is not whether to wait, but what to wait for—and what to acquire before certainty returns.

Family office capital is particularly relevant to this market. Kenya's pension assets under management reached Kshs 2.8 trillion in December 2025, representing 16.1 percent of GDP. Yet immovable property allocations within pension portfolios declined to 8.6 percent in 2025 from 11.1 percent in 2024, as schemes favoured more liquid government securities and equities. This creates a potential gap: institutional capital is growing, but its direct exposure to commercial real estate is not keeping pace. Family offices, with their longer time horizons, lower redemption pressure, and ability to negotiate directly, may fill this gap—provided they can identify assets that meet institutional standards.

The emergence of more sophisticated Kenyan family offices reinforces this thesis. The Chandaria family, through Chandaria Industries and its newly formalised family office structure, exemplifies a broader trend: third-generation leadership, professional governance, diversification into venture capital and real estate, and a willingness to partner with external capital. Darshan Chandaria, the 40-year-old chief executive, has explicitly stated that the family office is designed to strengthen governance and create structured pathways for outside investment. This evolution—from operating business to diversified family capital to institutional family office—is precisely the trajectory that could deepen demand for income-producing, institutional-grade commercial real estate.

India provides a useful comparative framework. The number of Indian family offices grew from approximately 45 in 2018 to nearly 300 in 2024, driven by liquidity events, IPOs, and a generational shift toward professional wealth management. More than 50 percent of surveyed Indian family offices have allocated more than half their portfolios to growth-oriented assets, with nearly 25 percent committing more than 20 percent to private equity and venture capital. Kenya is not India, and direct parallels should not be overstated. But the structural logic—entrepreneurial wealth, succession, professionalisation, direct investment, and international diversification—bears examination.

Across asset classes, Murivest's analysis points toward a clear hierarchy of conviction. Infrastructure-linked logistics—warehousing, distribution centres, cold chain, and build-to-suit facilities along the Mombasa Road, ICD, SGR, and Athi River corridors—offers the strongest combination of income durability, tenant demand, and structural scarcity. Prime office in Nairobi's CBD, Westlands, and Upper Hill offers selective opportunity, but only for assets that meet institutional-grade specifications; obsolete stock without clear repositioning economics should be avoided. Retail is shifting toward neighbourhood and community formats anchored by supermarket chains and convenience retail; large regional malls face structural headwinds. Hospitality is recovering, with Kenya welcoming 7.9 million tourists in 2025 and generating Kshs 500 billion in revenue, but underwriting requires operator expertise and a clear understanding of ADR, occupancy, RevPAR, and EBITDA dynamics. Specialised real estate—healthcare, education, student accommodation, data centres, and cold storage—remains nascent but strategically important.

Five Things Institutional Investors Should Know in 2026

1. The market is bifurcating, not collapsing.

Nairobi's prime office market is recovering through a flight to quality. Grade A occupancy has risen to approximately 81.6 percent, and rents have stabilised. The problem is not office as an asset class; it is obsolete stock that cannot compete on specifications, sustainability, or flexibility. Capital should concentrate on quality, not avoid the sector entirely.

2. The 2027 election is a risk factor, not a reason to freeze.

Historical evidence suggests that election-related uncertainty can delay transactions and weaken sentiment, but it does not necessarily destroy asset values. The 2013 and 2017 cycles produced modest growth decelerations rather than collapses. Investors who use the election as an excuse for inaction may miss pricing opportunities that motivated sellers create ahead of the polls.

3. Family office capital is becoming more institutional.

Kenyan entrepreneurial families are moving from informal wealth management toward structured family offices, investment committees, and professional governance. As they do so, their real estate requirements are shifting from "good buildings" to "institutional assets" with verifiable income, strong tenant covenants, and transparent ownership.

4. Logistics is the most structurally compelling sector.

The combination of SGR infrastructure, ICD expansion, Nairobi Expressway connectivity, and regional trade growth is creating institutional-quality logistics opportunities that did not exist five years ago. Build-to-suit warehousing, cold chain, and last-mile distribution facilities along the Mombasa Road–Athi River corridor deserve serious attention.

5. Waiting has a cost.

The wait-and-see approach is rational for speculative or development-oriented capital. For income-focused investors with long time horizons, however, the cost of waiting may exceed the benefit of political clarity. Scarce assets with strong tenant covenants and long leases do not become more available after elections; they often become more expensive as competing capital returns.

PART I — THE CAPITAL ENVIRONMENT

01 — East Africa's New Capital Cycle

East Africa is not a monolithic capital market. It is a collection of economies at different stages of development, with different currency regimes, different debt profiles, and different relationships with global capital. Understanding where commercial real estate capital is moving requires first understanding the capital pools that might deploy into it—and how each pool behaves differently.

Global Capital Entering Africa

Global institutional capital allocation to African real estate remains a fraction of what geographic scale and demographic growth might suggest. According to{' '} UNCTAD data {' '} cited by{' '} Cytonn Investment , foreign direct investment into Kenya reached a record USD 3.2 billion in 2025, up 37.7 percent from USD 2.3 billion in 2024. This increase was supported by investment in digital infrastructure and renewable energy. However, direct real estate investment by global institutional investors—pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and large asset managers—remains limited relative to other emerging markets.

The reasons are well documented: currency volatility, liquidity constraints, valuation opacity, governance concerns, and the small scale of individual transactions relative to the minimum ticket sizes of major global funds. A USD 5 million Nairobi office building is not material to a global pension fund with USD 50 billion in assets. It may, however, be precisely the right size for a family office, a private investment company, or a regional private-equity fund.

Regional Institutional Capital

East Africa's deepest pools of institutional capital are pension funds and insurance companies. Kenya's retirement benefits sector is the most developed in the region. According to the Retirement Benefits Authority (RBA) , assets under management increased by 24.6 percent to Kshs 2.8 trillion in December 2025, up from Kshs 2.3 trillion in December 2024. The pension-to-GDP ratio reached 16.1 percent, up from 14.6 percent the previous year. This is significantly below developed-market ratios—the United States stands at 169.5 percent, Australia at 132.6 percent, and the United Kingdom at 124.2 percent—but it exceeds most African peers, including South Africa at 83.8 percent, Namibia at 100.4 percent, Nigeria at 8.0 percent, and Uganda at 9.0 percent.

The composition of these assets, however, reveals a cautious posture. In 2025, Kenyan pension schemes allocated an average of 52.1 percent to government securities, 11.1 percent to quoted equities, and 8.6 percent to immovable property—down from 11.1 percent in 2024. The decline in real estate allocation is notable: it reflects liquidity preferences, valuation uncertainty, and the relative attractiveness of equities during the 2025 Nairobi All Share Index rally, which gained 48.9 percent for the full year. REIT allocations, while growing 22.8 percent year-on-year to Kshs 14.4 billion, remain a marginal share of total pension assets.

Private equity allocations, by contrast, surged 84.8 percent to Kshs 29.9 billion, and listed corporate bonds grew 349.0 percent to Kshs 28.3 billion. These flows suggest that pension capital is willing to embrace less liquid, longer-duration assets—but preferably in structures that offer clearer governance, reporting, and exit pathways than direct property ownership typically provides.

Family Offices and UHNW Capital

Knight Frank's 2026 Africa report provides a nuanced picture of Kenyan wealth. No Kenyan individual is currently reported to be worth more than USD 1 billion, a decline from 2025 when two individuals crossed that threshold. However, 6 percent of wealth managers report managing portfolios between USD 501 million and USD 1 billion, and Kenya is home to approximately 7,200 USD millionaires and roughly 16 centi-millionaires with net worth exceeding USD 100 million. Almost 44 percent of wealth managers reported that their high-net-worth client base grew by between 11 and 20 percent between 2025 and 2026.

More significant than the absolute numbers is the shift in investment behaviour. Knight Frank reports that wealthy Kenyans are moving away from concentrating wealth in luxury residential property and increasingly channelling capital into data centres, logistics facilities, REITs, renewable energy projects, and professionally managed rental housing. Mark Dunford, chief executive of Knight Frank Kenya , notes: "The modern investor is looking beyond conventional asset classes. There is growing interest in investments that combine income, resilience and long-term growth. This reflects a more sophisticated approach to wealth creation."

Diaspora Capital

The Kenyan diaspora represents a significant but diffuse capital pool. Remittance inflows have been a critical source of foreign exchange stability, supporting the shilling's relative stability at approximately Kshs 129 to the US dollar since mid-2024. Diaspora capital has historically flowed heavily into residential property—land acquisition, house construction, and rental apartments. However, a subset of diaspora investors, particularly those with professional experience in developed-market real estate, is increasingly interested in commercial income-producing assets.

The challenge for diaspora capital is not intent but execution: distance, governance opacity, and the difficulty of verifying tenant quality and lease terms from abroad create high due-diligence barriers. This is precisely where an advisory and verification function—such as Murivest's asset verification and underwriting process—can unlock capital that would otherwise remain in bank deposits or developed-market securities.

Cost of Capital and Currency Considerations

The Central Bank of Kenya's benchmark rate of 8.75 percent, while down significantly from the 12.50 percent peak of 2023, remains elevated by historical standards. The average mortgage lending rate stood at 14.9 percent as of late 2025. For leveraged acquisitions, this cost of capital demands disciplined underwriting: assets must generate sufficient net operating income to cover debt service at conservative loan-to-value ratios, with adequate debt service coverage ratios.

Currency stability has improved materially. The shilling's stabilisation near Kshs 129 to the US dollar, supported by record foreign exchange reserves, strong diaspora remittances, and Eurobond issuance, has reduced the currency risk premium that plagued investors in 2022–23. For foreign capital, this stability improves the relative cost of Kenyan assets. For domestic capital, it reduces imported inflation and supports business planning.

02 — Nairobi: East Africa's Commercial Capital

Nairobi's importance to East African commercial real estate cannot be overstated. It is the region's financial centre, its diplomatic hub, its technology ecosystem, and its primary destination for multinational regional headquarters. Understanding why Nairobi matters—and why its commercial real estate market behaves as it does—requires examining the city's economic architecture.

Economic Position and Regional Headquarters

Kenya's economy, with a nominal GDP of Kshs 17.6 trillion and real GDP growth of 4.6 percent in FY2025, is the largest in East Africa. Nairobi concentrates a disproportionate share of this economic activity. The city hosts the regional headquarters of major multinational corporations, international organisations, diplomatic missions, and financial institutions. The United Nations Environment Programme, the UN Human Settlements Programme, and numerous other international agencies maintain their African headquarters in Nairobi, creating a stable demand base for Grade A office space.

The financial services ecosystem is particularly deep. Kenya's banking sector, led by tier-one institutions such as Equity Group, KCB Group, Co-operative Bank, and Absa Bank Kenya, generates substantial demand for office space, both for headquarters functions and for branch networks. The Nairobi Securities Exchange, while smaller than its Johannesburg or Lagos counterparts, provides a capital-raising platform for listed real estate investment trusts and property companies.

Infrastructure and Connectivity

Nairobi's infrastructure position has improved materially in recent years. The Nairobi Expressway, completed in 2022, has reduced travel times between the CBD, Westlands, Upper Hill, and Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA). The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) connects Nairobi to Mombasa, East Africa's principal port, and the Nairobi Inland Container Depot (ICD) has become a critical logistics node. The proposed Railway City development—a multi-billion-shilling mixed-use project planned for the land around the Nairobi railway station—represents a long-term repositioning opportunity for the CBD.

JKIA itself is undergoing expansion, with plans to increase capacity and improve passenger experience. For hospitality assets, conference facilities, and serviced apartments, airport connectivity is a critical demand driver. For logistics and industrial real estate, the combination of SGR, ICD, and Expressway access is creating new locational premiums.

Technology and Innovation Ecosystem

Nairobi's technology ecosystem, centred on the "Silicon Savannah" narrative, has matured beyond startup hype. Companies such as Safaricom, which reported strong earnings contributing to the 2025 NSE rally, provide stable demand for office space, data centre capacity, and corporate services. The fintech sector, in particular, has created demand for flexible, high-specification office space in nodes such as Westlands and Kilimani.

The co-working and flexible office sector has expanded significantly. IWG, the global operator, added more than 25,800 square feet of new flexible workspace across Nairobi in 2025, including locations in Loresho, Crescent Parklands, and Mombasa Road. Workstyle opened its third Nairobi outlet. The former Hilton Hotel has been partially converted to Tulivu Coworking. This expansion reflects not merely a trend, but a structural shift in how companies—particularly technology firms, NGOs, and professional services—consume office space.

Population Growth and Urbanisation

Nairobi's population continues to grow rapidly, driven by both natural increase and rural-urban migration. The city's metropolitan area is projected to exceed 6 million residents by 2030. This growth creates demand for all forms of real estate—residential, commercial, industrial, and social infrastructure. However, the quality of that demand matters: a growing population of low-income residents does not automatically translate into demand for Grade A office space or institutional retail. The relevant metric is not population growth alone, but the growth of the consuming, employed, and formally sector-employed population.

03 — The Institutionalisation of Kenyan Real Estate

Kenyan commercial real estate is undergoing a slow but discernible transition from an informal, relationship-driven market toward a more institutional, data-driven one. This transition is incomplete, uneven, and occasionally frustrated by regulatory and market- structure constraints. But its direction is clear.

From Land to Buildings to Income

The traditional trajectory of Kenyan real estate investment has been: acquire land, develop or hold, sell or transfer. The focus was on capital appreciation, often driven by infrastructure announcements, zoning changes, or speculative demand. Rental income was secondary, and professional asset management was rare. This model persists, particularly in residential development and land banking, but it is increasingly challenged by a more institutional approach.

The institutional approach asks different questions: What is the net operating income? What is the weighted average unexpired lease term (WAULT)? What is the tenant covenant quality? What is the replacement cost? What is the exit liquidity? These questions require different skills—financial analysis, lease auditing, property management, and capital markets expertise—than the traditional development model.

REITs and Structured Vehicles

Kenya's REIT market, regulated by the Capital Markets Authority, was intended to accelerate this institutionalisation. The reality has been more modest. As of 2025, Kenya's REIT market faced persistent challenges: high capital requirements for trustees (Kshs 100.0 million versus Kshs 10.0 million for pension fund trustees), effectively restricting the role to banks; prolonged approval processes; high minimum subscription amounts (Kshs 0.1 million for D-REITs and Kshs 5.0 million for restricted I-REITs); and limited liquidity on public markets.

Most REITs, including Acorn Student Accommodation I-REIT, ASA D-REIT, and ILAM Fahari I-REIT, continued to trade on the Unquoted Securities Platform (USP) rather than the Main Market of the Nairobi Securities Exchange. Even LAPTRUST Imara I-REIT, which is listed on the NSE, trades in a restricted professional investor segment with low turnover. Mi Vida Homes has announced plans for a hybrid REIT to raise up to Kshs 20.0 billion, which would be a significant development if executed.

Despite these constraints, REITs represent an important structural direction. They force transparency, require audited financials, mandate dividend distributions, and create a governance framework that institutional investors demand. As the regulatory environment evolves and as larger, more credible sponsors enter the market, REITs could become a meaningful channel for institutional real estate capital.

Pension Fund Real Estate

The decline in pension fund allocations to immovable property—from 11.1 percent in 2024 to 8.6 percent in 2025—deserves careful interpretation. It does not indicate a loss of confidence in real estate as an asset class. Rather, it reflects relative liquidity preferences during a period of strong equity market performance and declining interest rates. Government securities still dominate at 52.1 percent of allocations, reflecting the safety mandate of pension trustees.

However, the absolute value of immovable property holdings remains substantial at Kshs 241.0 billion. The 3.3 percent year-on-year decline in value terms masks continued interest in specific transactions. What pension funds appear to be avoiding is not real estate per se, but the illiquidity, valuation opacity, and management burden of direct property ownership. Structures that offer real estate exposure with clearer governance, reporting, and liquidity—such as REITs, private equity real estate funds, and joint ventures with professional managers—are likely to attract increasing pension interest.

Professional Asset Managers

The growth of professional asset management in Kenya—GenAfrica, Co-optrust, Sanlam, Old Mutual, ICEA Lion, CIC, ABSA, NCBA, Britam, and others—creates an infrastructure for institutional real estate investment. These managers, with combined assets under management of Kshs 2,217.8 billion as of December 2025, have the scale, governance, and analytical capacity to underwrite real estate acquisitions in ways that individual investors or family businesses cannot.

The challenge is that most of these managers remain heavily weighted toward government securities and equities. Real estate expertise—particularly the specialised skills of commercial real estate underwriting, lease analysis, and asset management—is concentrated in a small number of firms. This concentration creates both a barrier and an opportunity: the barrier is limited competition and high fees for genuine expertise; the opportunity is that first movers with credible real estate capabilities can capture significant market share.

PART II — THE 2027 POLITICAL CYCLE

04 — The 2027 General Election: The Capital-Markets Question

This chapter does not predict the outcome of Kenya's August 2027 General Election. It does not endorse any political party or candidate. Its purpose is exclusively to analyse the election as a capital-markets and commercial-real-estate risk factor, and to examine how different election scenarios might affect the behaviour of buyers, sellers, developers, and occupiers.

Historical Evidence

Kenya's experience across previous election cycles provides the essential context. The 2007–08 cycle represents the most severe episode, with real GDP growth falling to 0.2 percent in 2008 from 6.9 percent in 2007 amid post-election violence and other domestic and global shocks. The 2013 election saw growth decelerate to 3.8 percent from 4.6 percent in 2012. The 2017 cycle produced a moderation from 4.2 percent to 3.8 percent, prolonged by the extended electioneering period and adverse weather conditions. The 2022 slowdown, from 7.6 percent to 4.9 percent, is less conclusive as an election effect given the unusually strong post-COVID rebound in 2021 and the severe drought in 2022.

Real estate sector growth specifically moderated to 6.7 percent in 2017 from 9.8 percent in 2016, and to 4.5 percent in 2022 from 6.7 percent in 2021. The sector's sensitivity to election cycles is therefore established, though the magnitude varies considerably depending on broader economic conditions.

Private-sector credit growth also varied. In 2013, credit growth increased to 20.1 percent in December from 12.0 percent in January. In contrast, credit growth stood at only 3.9 percent in December 2017 and declined further to 2.4 percent in December 2018, as prolonged political uncertainty continued to weigh on credit demand. As of July 2026, private-sector credit growth stood at 10.2 percent, indicating a relatively supportive credit environment ahead of the polls.

Business activity, as measured by the Stanbic Purchasing Managers' Index (PMI), weakened in both 2017 (declining from 52.0 in December 2016 to 42.0 in August 2017) and 2022 (declining from 53.1 in December 2021 to 44.2 in August 2022). In both cases, the index moved from expansionary to contractionary territory. As of July 2026, the PMI stood at 51.3, remaining in expansionary territory but vulnerable to election-related uncertainty.

Implications for Buyers

Acquisition timing. Buyers must decide whether to transact before the election, accepting political uncertainty, or to wait until after, accepting the risk that attractive assets may no longer be available or may have repriced upward. There is no universally correct answer; the optimal timing depends on the buyer's risk tolerance, the specific asset's scarcity, and the seller's motivation.

Financing. Lenders may become more cautious as the election approaches, particularly for speculative or development financing. Acquisition financing for income-producing assets with strong tenant covenants is likely to remain available, but terms may tighten and covenants may become more restrictive.

Valuation. Valuation uncertainty increases during election periods. Discount rates may rise as investors demand a higher risk premium. Cap rates for assets perceived as politically sensitive—government-tenanted buildings, assets in areas with historical security concerns—may widen.

Due diligence. Transaction timelines may lengthen as lawyers, valuers, and consultants become more cautious. Title verification, tenant covenant checks, and lease audits require additional scrutiny when political uncertainty is elevated.

Transaction certainty. Sellers may become more reluctant to commit to binding agreements ahead of an election, fearing that a change in government could affect zoning, taxation, or infrastructure plans. Break fees and material adverse change clauses may become more contentious.

Currency risk. The shilling has been stable at approximately Kshs 129 to the US dollar since mid-2024, supported by strong reserves and diaspora remittances. Election-related uncertainty could test this stability. Foreign buyers should consider hedging strategies or pricing in currency buffers.

Implications for Sellers

Liquidity requirements. Sellers with refinancing maturities, dividend commitments, or portfolio rebalancing needs may be forced to transact regardless of election timing. These motivated sellers can create pricing opportunities for prepared buyers.

Refinancing pressure. Assets with short-term debt maturing around the election may face refinancing risk if lenders retreat. This could create distressed or quasi-distressed sale opportunities.

Portfolio rebalancing. Institutional sellers—pension funds, insurance companies, REITs—may use the election as a catalyst to rebalance portfolios, selling non-core or underperforming assets. This can increase supply in secondary markets while leaving prime assets tightly held.

Valuation expectations. Sellers may anchor their price expectations to pre-election valuations, while buyers may demand an uncertainty discount. This bid-ask spread can freeze price discovery and reduce transaction volumes.

Strategic exits. Family offices and private investors considering generational transitions or diversification may accelerate exit timelines ahead of the election to avoid prolonged uncertainty.

Implications for Developers

Developers face a particularly acute timing dilemma. Construction starts require financing commitments, presales, and tenant pre-leasing that may be difficult to secure when political uncertainty is elevated. The 2026 development pipeline is already reflecting this caution: Knight Frank reports that most new office supply is targeting 2027/2028 completions, effectively deferring delivery until after the election.

For speculative development—projects without pre-committed tenants or financing—the case for starting construction in 2026 is weak. For build-to-suit or pre-leased developments, particularly in logistics and specialised industrial, the election may have less impact because tenant demand is driven by structural rather than cyclical factors.

Implications for Occupiers

Corporate occupiers—multinationals, financial institutions, technology firms, and government agencies—may delay expansion decisions ahead of the election. Lease renewals may be shortened. Hiring and capital expenditure plans may be deferred. This can weaken tenant demand for office space, particularly in speculative buildings without anchor tenants.

However, occupiers with long-term strategic commitments to East Africa—regional headquarters, diplomatic missions, international organisations—are less likely to reverse course based on an election cycle. Their demand is sticky, and their lease commitments tend to be longer-duration. Assets tenanted by these categories of occupier are therefore likely to be more resilient through the election period.

05 — The Wait-and-See Investor

The wait-and-see phenomenon is one of the most important behavioural dynamics ahead of the 2027 election. It is not simply a matter of investors feeling nervous. It is a rational response to uncertainty that carries significant—and often underappreciated—costs.

Why Investors Wait

Political uncertainty. Investors cannot know with certainty whether the 2027 election will produce an orderly transition, a prolonged contestation, or something more disruptive. The 2007–08 experience, while not predictive, remains a reference point that encourages caution.

Interest-rate uncertainty. The Central Bank of Kenya has held rates at 8.75 percent since February 2026, but the forward path is unclear. Oxford Economics expects a potential 50 basis point hike in Q4 2026 if food and fuel price pressures intensify. Goldman Sachs expects rates on hold through year-end, with easing resuming in Q1 2027. For leveraged buyers, this uncertainty complicates debt service projections.

Currency uncertainty. While the shilling has stabilised, election periods have historically produced exchange-rate volatility. The shilling depreciated by 0.7 percent in 2017 and 9.0 percent in 2022. A significant depreciation could erode the value of foreign-currency-denominated liabilities or reduce the dollar value of domestic assets.

Taxation and policy uncertainty. Election outcomes can produce changes in tax policy, regulatory enforcement, and government spending priorities. Investors may delay commitments until they have greater clarity on the policy environment.

Valuation uncertainty. When transaction volumes decline, price discovery weakens. Buyers and sellers may disagree on fair value, with sellers anchoring to pre-election prices and buyers demanding uncertainty discounts. This disagreement can freeze markets.

Tenant confidence. Corporate occupiers may delay expansion decisions, weakening near-term rental growth assumptions. Developers may delay starts, reducing near-term supply but also reducing construction activity and employment.

The Paradox of Waiting

Waiting is not costless. The wait-and-see investor faces a paradox: waiting may reduce political uncertainty while simultaneously increasing opportunity cost.

A buyer who waits until after August 2027 may gain greater political visibility, but may also lose: attractive pricing, as motivated sellers who need to transact before the election may accept discounts that disappear once uncertainty resolves; scarce assets, as prime, institutionally grade assets with strong tenant covenants and long leases are not infinitely available; favourable financing, as interest rates may rise rather than fall; and competitive positioning, as family offices and private capital that can move quickly may acquire the best assets during the uncertainty window.

What to Wait For

Investors who choose to wait should identify specific conditions that would cause them to deploy capital, rather than simply waiting for "clarity." Examples of specific conditions include: a clear election outcome with accepted results and no prolonged contestation; confirmation that the Central Bank's monetary policy trajectory remains accommodative; evidence that tenant demand has not deteriorated materially (e.g., PMI remaining above 50, corporate earnings stable); specific assets becoming available at prices that meet pre-defined underwriting thresholds; and financing terms that meet pre-defined debt service coverage requirements.

What to Acquire Before Certainty Returns

Conversely, certain categories of assets may be more attractive to acquire before the election than after: prime CBD office with multi-year leases to institutional tenants; logistics and warehousing along the Mombasa Road–Athi River corridor, where tenant demand is driven by infrastructure and trade rather than political cycles; income-producing retail anchored by supermarket chains with strong covenants and long lease terms; and hospitality assets with established operator relationships and forward bookings that demonstrate resilient demand.

06 — Three 2027 Scenarios

Murivest does not predict election outcomes. What follows is a scenario framework designed to help investors think through the implications of different political environments on commercial real estate capital allocation. We do not assign probabilities to these scenarios; where probabilities cannot be responsibly estimated, we use LOW / MEDIUM / HIGH likelihood descriptors based on historical precedent and current conditions.

Scenario A — Orderly Political Cycle

Description. The election is conducted without significant disruption. Results are accepted by major political actors. Power transitions, if it transitions, occur within constitutional frameworks. International observers validate the process. Policy continuity is largely maintained.

Likelihood. MEDIUM to HIGH. Kenya's 2013 and 2022 elections, while contested, did not produce the scale of disruption seen in 2007–08. Institutional maturity, independent media, and a robust civil society provide checks against severe breakdown.

Buyer behaviour. Buyers return to the market within weeks of the election. Transaction volumes recover. Foreign capital, which may have deferred commitments, resumes due diligence. Pricing stabilises or firms slightly as uncertainty discount is removed.

Seller behaviour. Sellers who deferred transactions ahead of the election bring assets to market. Supply increases modestly. Motivated sellers who needed to transact before the election are no longer present, reducing the pool of discounted assets.

Pricing. Prime assets firm as competing capital returns. Secondary assets may lag if supply increases faster than demand. Cap rates for prime office and logistics compress slightly as risk premium is reduced.

Liquidity. Transaction volumes recover to pre-election levels within one to two quarters. Financing conditions normalise. Private-sector credit growth continues its current trajectory.

Family offices. Family offices with prepared capital deploy selectively in the post-election window, targeting assets that were held back or that became available from sellers who preferred certainty over price optimisation.

Institutional capital. Pension funds and insurance companies, which are less sensitive to short-term political cycles, maintain their investment programmes. REITs may accelerate capital-raising if market sentiment improves.

Scenario B — Heightened Uncertainty

Description. The election produces contested results. Legal challenges prolong the resolution process for weeks or months. Political rhetoric remains heated. International concern is elevated but does not escalate to sanctions or capital flight. Policy direction becomes unclear.

Likelihood. MEDIUM. The 2017 experience demonstrated that Kenya's electoral institutions can produce prolonged contestation. While the country has matured since then, the polarisation of political competition creates a non-trivial risk of extended uncertainty.

Buyer behaviour. Buyers retreat to the sidelines. Transaction volumes decline sharply. Foreign capital defers commitments. Domestic capital focuses on defensive, income-producing assets and avoids speculative or development-oriented strategies.

Seller behaviour. Sellers with liquidity needs become more motivated, potentially accepting deeper discounts. Sellers without immediate pressure withdraw from the market entirely, reducing supply of prime assets.

Pricing. Bid-ask spreads widen. Price discovery weakens. Prime assets may hold value if owners are not forced sellers, but transaction volumes are too low to establish reliable comparables. Secondary assets face pricing pressure.

Liquidity. Transaction volumes may decline by 30–50 percent compared to pre-election levels. Financing conditions tighten as lenders increase risk premiums and reduce loan-to-value ratios. Private-sector credit growth slows.

Family offices. Family offices with strong liquidity positions and long time horizons may view this as an acquisition window, particularly for assets from distressed or motivated sellers. Family offices with leverage or liquidity constraints may become more conservative.

Institutional capital. Pension funds and insurance companies may reduce new commitments but are unlikely to become forced sellers. REITs may face unit price pressure if retail investors exit, but underlying asset values may remain stable if income streams are intact.

Scenario C — Material Market Disruption

Description. The election produces severe disruption—violence, institutional breakdown, or a prolonged constitutional crisis. Economic activity is materially impaired. International condemnation and potential sanctions are discussed. Capital flight occurs.

Likelihood. LOW. The 2007–08 experience was traumatic and remains salient, but Kenya's institutions, economy, and society have evolved considerably since then. The probability of a repeat at similar scale is low, though not zero.

Buyer behaviour. Most buyers withdraw entirely. Only the most risk-tolerant or strategically committed capital remains active. Foreign direct investment collapses. Domestic capital flees to government securities and hard currency.

Seller behaviour. Forced selling becomes widespread. Assets that were highly leveraged or dependent on short-term financing face distress. Prices may decline sharply, particularly for illiquid assets or assets in areas affected by security incidents.

Pricing. Cap rates widen dramatically. Valuation becomes theoretical rather than transactional. Replacement cost may exceed market value by a significant margin, creating potential value opportunities for capital that can endure the disruption.

Liquidity. Transaction volumes collapse. Financing becomes extremely difficult. Private-sector credit growth turns negative. The banking sector faces elevated non-performing loans.

Family offices. Family offices with generational time horizons and minimal leverage may view this as a generational buying opportunity, provided they have the liquidity and governance capacity to act. Family offices with leverage, concentrated exposure, or liquidity-dependent business models face severe stress.

Institutional capital. Pension funds and insurance companies face mark-to-market losses on equities and potentially on real estate if valuations are adjusted. REITs may face redemption pressure. The depth of the impact depends on the duration of the disruption and the policy response.

Leading Indicators

Investors should monitor the following indicators to assess which scenario is materialising: PMI trajectory—a decline below 45 would signal severe business activity contraction; credit growth—a sharp deceleration below 5 percent would indicate broad risk aversion; shilling stability—depreciation beyond Kshs 140 to the US dollar would signal capital flight concerns; NSE performance—sustained foreign outflows and index declines would indicate international investor positioning; government borrowing—supplementary budgets or accelerated domestic borrowing ahead of the election would signal fiscal stress; and tenant behaviour—lease renewal rates, expansion announcements, and hiring plans by major corporates provide real-time demand signals.

PART III — FAMILY OFFICE CAPITAL

07 — The Rise of the Kenyan Family Office

The emergence of structured family offices in Kenya is not a fringe phenomenon. It is a structural evolution that will reshape how private capital is deployed into commercial real estate, and it deserves serious analytical attention.

The Evolutionary Arc

Kenyan entrepreneurial wealth has traditionally been organised around operating businesses. The founder builds a company—manufacturing, trading, agriculture, services—and wealth is synonymous with the business itself. Diversification, if it occurs, happens informally: a property here, a farm there, perhaps a minority stake in a friend's venture. Governance is personal. Decision-making is centralised. Succession is often unresolved.

The transition from this model to a more institutional structure follows a recognisable arc: Founder wealth → Operating business → Multiple businesses → Investment holdings → Family investment company → Family office → Institutional capital allocation → Global diversification.

Kenya is not at the end of this arc. It is somewhere in the middle. A small number of families have reached the family office stage. A larger number are at the investment holdings or family investment company stage. The majority remain centred on operating businesses with informal diversification.

Why the Transition Is Accelerating

Succession. First-generation founders are aging. The question of what happens to the business—and the wealth it has created—when the founder steps back or passes away is becoming urgent. Informal structures that worked while the founder was alive become fragile when multiple siblings, cousins, and in-laws have legitimate claims.

Wealth preservation. Families that have experienced economic cycles, currency devaluations, and regulatory changes recognise that concentrating wealth in a single business or sector is risky. Diversification is not a luxury; it is a survival strategy.

Governance. As families grow and businesses become more complex, personal decision-making becomes a bottleneck. Investment committees, external advisors, and formal governance structures become necessary to manage disputes, set strategy, and maintain family cohesion.

Professional investment management. The next generation of wealthy Kenyans is increasingly educated abroad and exposed to global best practices in portfolio management. They return with expectations of reporting, risk management, and performance measurement that informal family structures cannot meet.

Direct investing. Family offices often prefer direct investments—real estate, private equity, private credit—over public market allocations because direct investments offer control, influence, and the ability to add operational value. Commercial real estate is a natural fit for this preference.

International diversification. Kenyan families are increasingly aware of concentration risk—currency, jurisdiction, and sector. International diversification requires professional structures capable of cross-border tax planning, compliance, and reporting.

The Real Estate Implication

As Kenyan families professionalise their capital, their real estate requirements change. The informal approach—buying a building because the price seems reasonable or because a broker recommended it—gives way to a more analytical approach: What is the net operating income? Who are the tenants, and how strong are their covenants? What is the WAULT? What is the replacement cost? What is the exit liquidity? How does this asset fit into the family's overall portfolio?

This shift increases demand for institutional-quality assets and reduces demand for speculative or secondary properties. It also increases demand for professional intermediaries—advisors, asset managers, underwriters—who can provide the analysis and governance that family offices require.

08 — The Indian Family Office Parallel

India provides the most relevant comparative framework for understanding how Kenyan family capital may evolve. The comparison is not predictive; Kenya is not India, and direct parallels should not be overstated. But the structural logic of entrepreneurial wealth institutionalisation is similar enough to warrant serious examination.

The Indian Trajectory

According to the{' '} Julius Baer and EY Indian Family Office Playbook 2025 , the number of family offices in India grew more than sixfold in six years, from approximately 45 in 2018 to nearly 300 in 2024. India is now home to roughly 13,000 families with net worths above USD 30 million, a number expected to increase to 19,000 by 2028. Umang Papneja, CEO of Julius Baer India, observes: "Every day, about three individuals cross the USD 30 million threshold, placing India behind only the US and China in terms of new UHNW entrants."

The evolution of Indian family offices follows a clear pattern: Founder wealth created through operating businesses in manufacturing, technology, pharmaceuticals, and services; Operating business generates cash flows that exceed reinvestment needs; Diversification into real estate, financial assets, and minority business stakes; Investment holding structures are formalised to manage the growing portfolio; Professional family governance is introduced—family constitutions, investment committees, external advisors; Family office is established as a dedicated structure with professional staff; Institutional capital allocation replaces ad hoc investing with strategic asset allocation, risk budgeting, and performance measurement; Global diversification extends the portfolio beyond India into developed and emerging markets.

Why India Is Relevant to Kenya

Several structural similarities make India a relevant comparator: Entrepreneurial wealth creation in both economies has produced significant fortunes through family-owned businesses rather than through salaried employment or public market entrepreneurship alone. Family-owned business dominance—a large share of GDP in both countries is generated by family-controlled enterprises. Succession challenges in both face generational transitions as founders age and next-generation leaders assume responsibility. Professionalisation pressure in both is experiencing pressure from educated next-generation family members to adopt global best practices in governance and investment management. Direct investment preference—family offices in both contexts show a strong preference for direct investments in real estate, private equity, and private credit over passive public market allocations. Real estate as a core allocation in both India and Kenya is a preferred asset class for family offices because it offers income, inflation sensitivity, tangible collateral, and long holding periods. International diversification—as families in both countries mature, they increasingly seek exposure beyond their home market.

Key Differences

The differences are equally important: Scale—India's economy and wealth pool are orders of magnitude larger than Kenya's. Indian family offices can justify dedicated CIOs, research teams, and global offices. Kenyan family offices are typically smaller and more reliant on external advisors. Capital markets depth—India's capital markets are deeper and more liquid, providing easier access to public equities, bonds, and structured products. Kenya's capital markets are shallower, making direct real estate and private equity relatively more important. Regulatory environment—India's regulatory framework for family offices, trusts, and investment vehicles is more developed. Kenya's framework is evolving, with less clarity on tax treatment and cross-border structuring. Diaspora capital—India's diaspora is larger and more economically integrated into global financial centres, providing a deeper pool of international capital and expertise. Kenya's diaspora is significant but less concentrated in major financial centres. Geopolitical position—India's geopolitical importance gives its entrepreneurs greater access to global capital, technology, and markets. Kenya's regional importance is significant but not comparable.

The Analytical Hypothesis

The relevant question is not whether Kenya will replicate India's trajectory, but whether Kenya is entering an earlier stage of a similar family-capital institutionalisation cycle. Murivest's analytical hypothesis is that it is. The evidence includes: The Chandaria family's explicit move to formalise its family office structure; The growing number of Kenyan families establishing investment holding companies and family investment vehicles; The increasing sophistication of wealth management offerings by Kenyan banks and asset managers; The shift in HNWI investment preferences away from luxury residential property and toward income-producing, institutional-grade assets.

09 — The Chandaria Family and the Evolution of Kenyan Family Capital

The Chandaria family provides a case study in the evolution of Kenyan family capital from operating business to diversified investment platform. This analysis is based entirely on publicly available information. Murivest does not claim access to private family information, and where the family's formal family office structure is not publicly disclosed in detail, we state this explicitly.

Publicly Documented Facts

Chandaria Industries Ltd. was founded in 1964 and is the largest company within the Chandaria Group portfolio. It manufactures tissue, hygiene products, and sanitary napkins across Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda under brands including Velvex, Nice and Soft, and Toilex. Annual revenues were estimated at approximately USD 486 million in 2025. The group employs more than 3,000 people directly and supports tens of thousands more through its paper recycling supply chain.

The group's operations extend beyond manufacturing into real estate, venture capital, insurance, banking, and solar energy. Its real estate division manages more than one million square feet of industrial warehouse space and is exploring further expansion. The group has also moved into venture-style investing through Chandaria Capital, founded in 2017, which now has more than 15 portfolio companies across Africa and beyond, with a portfolio currently valued at approximately USD 25 million.

Darshan Chandaria, the 40-year-old chief executive and third- generation leader, holds a business degree from Cardiff University and completed Harvard Business School's Senior Executive Program. He took over as group CEO and has spent the past decade pushing the business into new territory.

The Family Office Development

In March 2026, Darshan Chandaria publicly confirmed that the family is formalising its investment structure through a family office. In interviews with{' '} Business Insider Africa {' '} and{' '} Crain Currency , he stated: "We've done a lot of what we've done to this point on our own. The shareholding, the equity has been the family. I think we'll see more collaboration in our diversification." He added: "The family office is already set up; we now need to further strengthen its governance, mandate, and efficiency."

This public disclosure is significant for several reasons: It confirms that one of Kenya's longest-standing business families recognises the need for formal governance structures; It signals a willingness to partner with external capital rather than relying exclusively on family equity; It demonstrates that the family is thinking about capital allocation as a distinct function from operations management.

Analytical Interpretation

The Chandaria evolution illustrates several broader themes relevant to Kenyan family capital: Third-generation leadership—Darshan Chandaria represents a generation that has been educated internationally, exposed to global capital markets, and trained in professional management disciplines. This generation is more likely to embrace institutional governance than the founding generation. Diversification beyond operations—The family's expansion from manufacturing into real estate, venture capital, and financial services reflects a recognition that operating business cash flows should be deployed across asset classes to reduce concentration risk. Governance formalisation—The explicit mention of strengthening "governance, mandate, and efficiency" indicates a move away from informal family decision-making toward structured processes. This is a prerequisite for attracting institutional partners. External capital readiness—The statement that "we'll see more collaboration in our diversification" suggests openness to joint ventures, private equity partnerships, or co-investment structures. This is a significant shift from the traditional family-business model of 100 percent family ownership.

Broader Implications

For other Kenyan entrepreneurial families, the Chandaria case suggests several lessons: Start before you have to—the family office structure is being strengthened while the operating business is healthy, not in response to a crisis. This timing allows for thoughtful design rather than reactive improvisation. Governance is a competitive advantage—formal governance structures make it easier to attract institutional partners, negotiate better terms, and maintain family cohesion across generations. Diversification requires professional capability—moving from one business to multiple asset classes requires skills that may not exist within the operating business. External capital can accelerate growth—family equity alone may be insufficient to capture the largest opportunities. Structured partnerships can multiply capital deployment capacity.

10 — Kenya's Next Generation of Family Offices

Beyond the Chandaria family, a broader ecosystem of Kenyan entrepreneurial families is gradually moving toward more structured capital management. This chapter examines the characteristics of this emerging family office landscape and its implications for commercial real estate demand.

The Emerging Landscape

Public information does not permit a precise census of Kenyan family offices. What is observable, however, is a pattern of behaviour across multiple families: Family investment companies are being established as holding vehicles for diversified assets; Investment committees are being formed, often including external members with professional investment experience; External CIO arrangements are becoming more common, particularly for families whose operating businesses no longer require full-time management attention from the founder; Private investment vehicles are being created to pool family capital with that of trusted partners; Real estate investment platforms are being established to consolidate property holdings and professionalise asset management.

Why This Matters to Commercial Real Estate

The key thesis is direct: as Kenyan families professionalise their capital, their property requirements change from "good buildings" to "institutional assets." The informal family investor may be satisfied with a building in a decent location, a broker's assurance that it is "a good deal," a rough estimate of rental income, and personal management of tenant relationships. The institutional family office demands audited net operating income, verified tenant covenants and lease terms, professional property management, transparent ownership and title, clear exit pathways, risk-adjusted return analysis, and portfolio-level diversification.

This shift has several consequences for commercial real estate markets: Increased demand for income-producing assets—family offices prioritise cash flow over speculative appreciation. Assets with established tenant bases and long lease terms become more attractive than development projects or land banking. Increased demand for institutional tenants—family offices value tenant quality as much as location. A building let to a multinational corporation, a tier-one bank, or a government agency is more attractive than a building let to small, uncreditworthy tenants, even if the latter generates a higher gross yield. Increased demand for professional management—family offices are willing to pay for professional property management, lease administration, and asset oversight. Increased demand for portfolio acquisitions—rather than acquiring individual buildings one at a time, family offices may seek to acquire portfolios that offer diversification and scale economies. Increased demand for long-duration income—family offices with generational time horizons value long leases, rent escalation clauses, and contractual income certainty.

The Risks

The family office model is not without risks: Concentration—even diversified family offices may remain heavily concentrated in Kenyan assets and Kenyan shillings, exposing them to country-specific and currency-specific risks. Illiquidity—direct real estate is inherently illiquid. Family offices that over-allocate to property may face liquidity constraints if operating businesses require capital or if family members demand distributions. Governance—family offices are not immune to governance failures. Conflicts between family members, unclear mandates, and inadequate oversight can produce poor investment decisions. Succession—the transition from one generation to the next remains a critical vulnerability. Leverage—family offices that use leverage to amplify returns may face distress if interest rates rise, tenant defaults increase, or property values decline. Valuation opacity—without regular, independent valuations, family offices may hold assets at unrealistic values, distorting portfolio allocation and performance measurement. Operational complexity—managing a diversified portfolio of real estate, private equity, and financial assets requires capabilities that many family offices are still building.

PART IV — COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE

11 — Nairobi Office

The Nairobi office market is the most analysed, most traded, and most misunderstood segment of East African commercial real estate. Murivest's analysis begins with a simple question: is Nairobi office structurally weak, or is the market simply bifurcating between quality and obsolescence?

Market Overview

According to{' '} Knight Frank's Africa Office Market Dashboard {' '} for H2 2025, the Kenyan office market continued its period of growth stagnation through the second half of 2025, underpinned by steady absorption in the Grade A segment and a slow development pipeline. Prime Grade A office rents have remained broadly flat at approximately US$13 per square metre per month, extending a two-year period of rental stability and reflecting an equilibrium between improving occupier demand and the effects of historic oversupply.

Market fundamentals strengthened over the review period, with prime Grade A occupancy increasing from 77.7 percent to 80.3 percent. By December 2025, Knight Frank reported that occupancy had climbed further to 81.58 percent, marking a 4.98 percent increase. This improvement was largely driven by strong tenant uptake in high- quality developments completed in late 2024, such as Purple Tower and The Mandrake, combined with the absence of significant new office completions in 2025.

Despite rising occupancy levels, leasing conditions remain tenant-favourable. Occupiers continue to exert pricing and structural leverage, with negotiations increasingly shaped by cost optimisation, building efficiency, and ESG credentials rather than headline rents alone. Sustainability has become a core decision driver, evidenced by landmark developments such as the US Embassy complex in Nairobi achieving LEED certification, reinforcing the growing preference among multinationals, diplomatic missions, and international organisations for environmentally certified buildings.

The Flight to Quality

The most important structural dynamic in Nairobi's office market is the flight to quality. Demand is not weak; it is selective. Tenants—particularly multinationals, financial institutions, and international organisations—are consolidating into buildings that offer: modern specifications (floor loading, ceiling heights, air conditioning, backup power); strong ESG credentials (LEED certification, energy efficiency, water management); flexible lease structures (shorter initial terms, expansion options, contraction rights); superior amenities (parking, security, conferencing, fitness facilities); and reliable building management (professional property management, responsive maintenance).

Buildings that do not meet these standards face persistent vacancy, rent competition, and capital value erosion. The market is not failing; it is filtering.

Submarket Analysis

CBD. The Nairobi CBD remains the historic commercial core, but its office stock is aging. Accessibility constraints, limited parking, and older building specifications have pushed much of the Grade A demand to Westlands and Upper Hill. However, the CBD retains value for certain tenant categories—government agencies, legal and professional services, and businesses serving the CBD's dense daytime population. The proposed Railway City development represents a long-term repositioning catalyst. For investors, the CBD offers value-add and repositioning opportunities for buildings with strong land values and conversion potential, but core investors should be selective.

Westlands. Westlands has emerged as Nairobi's premier office node. Strong infrastructure, good security, proximity to diplomatic residences, and a growing retail and hospitality ecosystem make it the preferred location for multinational corporations and international organisations. Prime rents here command a premium, and vacancy rates for Grade A stock are lower than the market average. The expansion of flexible office space by operators such as IWG underscores the area's dynamism. Murivest's conviction for prime Westlands office is high.

Upper Hill. Upper Hill offers a mix of institutional office, residential, and hospitality. It has attracted major corporate headquarters and government institutions. The area benefits from good Expressway connectivity and relative proximity to both the CBD and Westlands. However, some buildings in Upper Hill suffer from oversupply in specific segments, and tenant competition can be intense. Selective opportunity exists for assets with strong tenant covenants and modern specifications.

Kilimani. Kilimani has evolved into a mixed-use node popular with technology firms, NGOs, and professional services. The area offers a more residential feel than Westlands or Upper Hill, which appeals to certain tenant categories. Rents are moderate, and the area attracts companies seeking cost-efficient but respectable addresses. For investors, Kilimani offers moderate yields with moderate growth prospects.

Parklands. Parklands remains a secondary office node with a strong Asian business community presence. It offers lower rents than Westlands and can be attractive for back-office functions, trading companies, and SMEs. Liquidity is lower, and institutional tenant demand is thinner.

Mombasa Road / Industrial Area / Ruaraka / Athi River. These corridors are primarily industrial and logistics locations rather than prime office nodes. However, the growth of logistics, last-mile delivery, and light manufacturing is creating demand for office space integrated with warehouse and distribution facilities. This "industrial office" segment is distinct from prime CBD office and should be analysed on different metrics.

Supply Pipeline

Knight Frank estimates that approximately 2.5 million square feet of office floor space is under development, although most of it is expected to come to market in 2027/2028. The 2026 pipeline mirrors 2025, with limited new supply as developers target post-election completions. This constrained short-term supply will most likely support higher occupancies in existing stock, as already observed in 2025.

For investors, the delayed pipeline is a double-edged sword. In the near term, limited supply supports occupancy and rent stability for existing prime assets. In the medium term, the 2027/2028 supply wave could reintroduce tenant-favourable conditions if demand does not keep pace.

The Co-Working Factor

The expansion of co-working and flexible office space is a structural shift, not a cyclical trend. IWG significantly expanded its footprint in 2025, delivering more than 2,000 square metres of new flexible workspace across strategic locations including Loresho, Crescent Parklands, and Mombasa Road. Workstyle opened its third Nairobi location. The former Hilton Hotel has been partially converted to Tulivu Coworking. The launch of Worknest in Runda underscores the breadth of this trend.

However, the sector is not without casualties. Kofisi, a London- based co-working operator, shut two outlets in Kenya in December 2025 following a Kshs 412.9 million loss in 2024, focusing instead on larger, higher-capacity sites.

For institutional investors, co-working expansion has two implications. First, it reduces demand for traditional long-term leases from certain tenant categories—start-ups, SMEs, project-based teams—who prefer flexibility. Second, it creates a new asset class: buildings designed for or converted to flexible office use, operated by professional providers with institutional-grade lease structures.

12 — Industrial & Logistics

If Nairobi office is the most debated asset class, industrial and logistics may be the most compelling. Murivest's central question for this sector is: could infrastructure-linked logistics become one of East Africa's most institutionally investable real-estate sectors?

The Structural Case

The case for logistics rests on several structural pillars: Regional trade growth—East African Community trade continues to expand, driven by manufacturing growth, consumer demand, and infrastructure investment. Kenya, as the region's most developed logistics hub, captures a disproportionate share of this flow. SGR and ICD—the Standard Gauge Railway and the Nairobi Inland Container Depot have fundamentally altered cargo flows between Mombasa Port and the hinterland. While last-mile costs and empty container return logistics remain challenges, the overall trajectory is toward greater rail-linked logistics efficiency. Nairobi Expressway—reduced travel times between JKIA, the ICD, Mombasa Road, and the CBD have improved the economics of last-mile distribution. E-commerce growth—the expansion of online retail, while still nascent relative to developed markets, is driving demand for last-mile fulfilment centres, cold chain, and sortation facilities. Build-to-suit demand—large tenants are increasingly demanding build-to-suit facilities that meet their specific operational requirements.

Submarket Analysis

Mombasa Road. The Mombasa Road corridor remains the primary logistics artery. Warehouse rental rates range from Kshs 35 to 60 per square foot per month depending on grade and location. The corridor offers the best combination of port connectivity, ICD access, and road transport links. However, traffic congestion and land scarcity in the most desirable nodes are constraints.

Athi River. Athi River has emerged as a key logistics and industrial node, benefiting from lower land costs, improving infrastructure, and proximity to both Nairobi and the SGR. Industrial parks and build-to-suit developments are increasingly locating here. For investors willing to accept a slightly longer hold period, Athi River offers attractive entry pricing and growth potential.

ICD / SGR Corridor. The area around the Nairobi Inland Container Depot is becoming a specialised logistics hub. Container handling, bonded warehousing, and transit cargo facilities are concentrated here. The specialist nature of this submarket requires expertise in customs, transit, and port logistics, but the barrier to entry also protects yields for incumbent operators.

JKIA Corridor. The airport corridor serves aviation-linked logistics—perishables, high-value goods, e-commerce express, and hospitality supply chain. Cold chain facilities, in particular, are undersupplied relative to demand.

Asset Categories

Warehousing and distribution centres. The core of the logistics market. Demand is strongest for modern, high-bay warehouses with clear heights of 8+ metres, wide column grids, heavy floor loading, and ample turning circles for articulated vehicles. Older, low-bay godowns with poor specifications face obsolescence risk similar to secondary office.

Cold chain. Kenya's agricultural exports—flowers, vegetables, fruits—require temperature-controlled logistics from farm to airport. Domestic demand for frozen and chilled foods is also growing. Cold chain facilities are structurally undersupplied and command premium rents. However, they require specialised expertise in refrigeration, energy management, and hygiene compliance.

Build-to-suit facilities. For institutional investors with development capability or access to credible development partners, build-to-suit logistics offers the opportunity to create assets with long-term leases to creditworthy tenants from inception. The risk is construction and leasing execution; the reward is an asset with no vacancy period and a tenant relationship established from day one.

Last-mile logistics. Smaller facilities, typically 1,000–5,000 square metres, located close to population centres for e-commerce fulfilment, parcel sortation, and rapid delivery. This segment is growing rapidly but remains fragmented, with most facilities operated by occupiers rather than institutional landlords.

13 — Retail & Mixed Use

Kenyan retail is undergoing a structural transformation that is often mischaracterised as a cyclical downturn. The reality is more nuanced: demand is shifting from large, destination-oriented formats toward smaller, community-anchored, convenience-oriented formats.

The Shift in Consumer Behaviour

Knight Frank's Kenya Market Update for H2 2025 identifies a clear pivot: "The outlook for Kenya's retail real estate market in 2026 will be defined by a continued shift toward neighbourhood centres and mixed-use developments, with less emphasis on large regional malls." Supermarket chains such as Carrefour, traditionally associated with higher-end locations, have begun expanding into middle-income areas such as Ruai, underscoring the sector's pivot toward community-based retailing.

This focus on middle-income areas is expected to deepen, with developers targeting localised retail hubs that offer convenience, accessibility, and essential services rather than aspirational shopping experiences. The shift is driven by several factors: urban traffic congestion makes large regional malls less convenient for frequent shopping trips; the growth of e-commerce reduces the need for physical retail space in certain categories; supermarket chains are consolidating market share and expanding into underserved neighbourhoods; and mixed-use developments that combine retail, office, and residential are more efficient land uses in dense urban areas.

Institutional Retail Formats

For institutional investors, the relevant retail formats are: Supermarket-anchored neighbourhood centres—small to medium-sized retail centres anchored by a major supermarket chain (Carrefour, Naivas, Quickmart, Chandarana) with complementary tenants such as pharmacies, banks, restaurants, and service providers. These assets offer income durability because supermarket demand is non-discretionary and the anchor tenant provides foot traffic for smaller units. Community retail—strip malls and small retail parks serving residential catchments of 5,000–20,000 households. These assets typically have lower rents than regional malls but higher occupancy stability and lower tenant turnover. Mixed-use developments—projects that combine ground-floor retail with upper-floor office or residential. These formats are increasingly popular in dense urban nodes such as Westlands, Kilimani, and Upper Hill, where land scarcity makes single-use development inefficient.

The Regional Mall Challenge

Large regional malls—those exceeding 50,000 square metres of gross lettable area—face structural headwinds. Several factors contribute: Oversupply in certain nodes has created intense tenant competition and rent pressure; E-commerce is capturing a growing share of discretionary spending, particularly in electronics, apparel, and home goods; Tenant mix is shifting toward experience-oriented uses—food and beverage, entertainment, fitness—which generate lower rents per square metre than traditional retail; Capital intensity is high, and returns on investment for new mall development have declined as land and construction costs have risen while rental growth has stagnated.

This does not mean all regional malls are failing. Malls in prime locations with strong anchor tenants, good accessibility, and professional management can remain viable. But the era of indiscriminate mall development is over. New supply should be approached with caution unless it is supported by clear demand evidence, pre-committed tenants, and conservative underwriting.

14 — Hospitality

Kenya's hospitality sector is recovering from the severe disruption of the COVID-19 pandemic, but the recovery is uneven and requires institutional-grade underwriting to separate genuine opportunity from superficial optimism.

Tourism Fundamentals

According to the{' '} Kenya Tourism Board , Kenya welcomed 7.9 million international visitors in 2025, generating Kshs 500 billion in revenue. International arrivals rose 9 percent year-on-year. This recovery is supported by several factors: improved global travel demand as pandemic restrictions have been fully lifted; Kenya's strong brand as a safari and beach destination; improved air connectivity, including new routes and increased frequencies by major carriers; and government investment in tourism infrastructure and marketing.

However, the sector remains vulnerable to external shocks: geopolitical tensions in key source markets (Europe, North America, Asia); global economic slowdown affecting discretionary travel spending; and domestic security incidents that can rapidly alter international perceptions.

Nairobi Hospitality

Nairobi's hospitality market serves multiple demand segments: Business travel—corporate executives, government officials, and conference attendees represent the core weekday demand. This segment is sensitive to economic conditions and corporate travel budgets. Diplomatic and NGO demand —Nairobi's status as a regional headquarters for international organisations creates stable, year-round demand for mid-to-upscale hotels and serviced apartments. This demand is less cyclical than pure business travel. Conference and events—Nairobi has established itself as a conference hub for East Africa, with venues such as the Kenyatta International Convention Centre and newer hotel conference facilities attracting regional and international events. Transit and layover—JKIA's role as a regional aviation hub creates demand for airport-area hotels serving transit passengers and airline crews.

Institutional Metrics

Hospitality underwriting requires a different analytical framework from office or industrial. The key metrics are: ADR (Average Daily Rate)—the average room revenue per occupied room per night. This metric reflects pricing power and brand positioning. Occupancy—the percentage of available rooms sold. This metric reflects demand strength and competitive positioning. RevPAR (Revenue per Available Room)—calculated as ADR multiplied by occupancy. This is the standard metric for comparing hotel performance across markets and properties. EBITDA—earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation. This metric reflects operational profitability before capital structure and accounting effects. FF&E Reserve—a reserve for furniture, fixtures, and equipment replacement, typically 3–5 percent of gross revenue. This is a real cost that must be deducted from cash flow. Valuation—hospitality assets are typically valued using a discounted cash flow approach or by applying a capitalisation rate to stabilised EBITDA. Comparable sales analysis is less reliable than in office or industrial because hospitality transactions are less frequent and more operationally specific.

The Operator Question

A critical factor in hospitality investment is the operator. An institutional-grade hotel with a weak operator can underperform a secondary hotel with a strong operator. International brands—Marriott, Hilton, Radisson, Best Western—provide brand recognition, reservation systems, and operational standards that can command premium ADRs. However, management fees (typically 3–5 percent of gross revenue plus incentive fees) reduce net operating income.

For investors, the operator agreement should be analysed as carefully as the real estate itself: What is the term? What are the termination rights? What are the fee structures? What performance tests apply? What capital expenditure obligations does the operator have? A poorly structured operator agreement can destroy value even in a strong market.

15 — Specialised Real Estate

Specialised real estate—assets designed for specific uses rather than general occupancy—represents the frontier of institutional investment in East Africa. These sectors are nascent, often illiquid, and require specialised expertise. But they also offer structural scarcity, high barriers to entry, and tenant stickiness that can produce superior risk-adjusted returns for informed capital.

Healthcare Real Estate

Kenya's healthcare infrastructure is undersupplied relative to demand. The population is growing and aging, non-communicable diseases are increasing, and the middle class is demanding higher-quality care. This creates demand for: Specialist hospitals and day surgery centres; Diagnostic and imaging facilities; Outpatient clinics in residential catchments; and Medical office buildings that consolidate multiple practitioners.

Healthcare real estate is attractive because tenant demand is non-discretionary, leases are typically long-term (10–15 years), and tenant investment in fit-out creates high switching costs. However, the sector requires understanding of healthcare regulation, reimbursement dynamics, and operator creditworthiness. A hospital tenant that depends on government reimbursement is a different credit risk from one that serves cash-paying private patients.

Education and Student Accommodation

Kenya's education sector is expanding rapidly, driven by population growth and increasing demand for tertiary and vocational education. Student accommodation is structurally undersupplied near major universities and colleges. Acorn Holdings has demonstrated the viability of this sector through its student accommodation I-REIT, though liquidity constraints have limited its market performance.

For institutional investors, education real estate offers long lease terms, stable demand, and inflation-linked rent escalation. The risks include regulatory changes affecting tuition fees, competition from new institutions, and the operational complexity of managing student housing.

Data Centres

East Africa's digital economy is growing rapidly, driven by cloud adoption, fintech expansion, and government digitisation. Data centre demand is concentrated in Nairobi, which offers the best combination of power reliability, fibre connectivity, and skilled labour. However, Kenya's power costs and reliability remain constraints relative to global data centre hubs.

Data centre real estate is highly specialised, requiring significant capital investment in power, cooling, and security infrastructure. Leases are typically long-term (10–20 years) with strong tenant covenants (global cloud providers, telecommunications companies). The barrier to entry is high, which protects yields for incumbent operators.

Cold Storage and Cold Chain

As noted in the logistics chapter, cold chain facilities are structurally undersupplied. Kenya's agricultural exports—flowers, vegetables, avocados—require temperature-controlled logistics. Domestic demand for frozen and chilled foods is growing with supermarket expansion and changing dietary habits.

Cold storage real estate requires specialised construction (insulated panels, refrigeration plant, backup power), operational expertise (temperature monitoring, hygiene compliance), and significant energy consumption. These barriers protect incumbent operators but also limit new supply.

Life Sciences and Specialised Industrial

Pharmaceutical manufacturing, medical device assembly, and biotechnology research require specialised facilities with clean room specifications, controlled environments, and regulatory compliance. This sector is embryonic in Kenya but has strategic importance as the government seeks to reduce pharmaceutical import dependence.

PART V — CAPITAL ALLOCATION

16 — Where Should Capital Go?

This chapter presents Murivest's proprietary capital allocation framework for East African commercial real estate in 2026. It is not a generic market overview. It is a disciplined ranking of sectors and strategies according to the criteria that institutional capital should apply: income quality, tenant covenant, scarcity, growth potential, liquidity, replacement cost, political sensitivity, financing sensitivity, and exit potential.

The Murivest Capital Conviction Score™

Murivest has developed an original 100-point scoring system to evaluate commercial real estate opportunities. This is a proprietary analytical framework and not an industry-standard rating. It is designed to bring discipline and comparability to investment decisions across different asset classes, locations, and strategies.

The score is calculated as follows: Income quality (20 points)—the stability, durability, and growth trajectory of rental income. Factors include lease length, rent escalation clauses, tenant diversity, and historical collection rates. Tenant covenant (15 points)—the creditworthiness and strategic importance of the tenant base. Factors include financial strength, industry position, lease commitment, and switching costs. Location (15 points)—the strategic positioning of the asset within its submarket and the broader Nairobi metropolitan area. Factors include accessibility, infrastructure, proximity to demand generators, and supply competition. Scarcity (10 points)—the difficulty of replicating the asset's locational or functional advantages. Factors include land availability, zoning constraints, infrastructure dependence, and competitive supply. Yield (15 points) —the current income return relative to risk and alternative investments. Factors include net initial yield, yield compression or expansion potential, and cost of capital. Growth (10 points)—the potential for income and capital value appreciation. Factors include rental growth prospects, development potential, and market trajectory. Liquidity (5 points) —the ease of eventual exit. Factors include transaction frequency, buyer pool depth, and financing availability. Lease quality (5 points)—the contractual protections and flexibility embedded in lease agreements. Factors include lease length, break options, rent reviews, and tenant obligations. Asset quality (5 points)—the physical condition, specifications, and management standards of the building. Factors include age, specifications, ESG credentials, and professional management.

An asset scoring 90–100 receives a STRONG BUY recommendation. An asset scoring 80–89 receives a BUY recommendation. An asset scoring 70–79 receives a SELECTIVE BUY recommendation. An asset scoring 60–69 receives a WATCH recommendation. An asset scoring below 60 receives a PASS recommendation.

The Murivest Institutional Asset Quality Matrix™

The matrix classifies assets along two dimensions: income stability (low to high) and growth potential (low to high). This produces four quadrants: Core (high income stability, moderate growth)—stable, income-producing assets with long leases to institutional tenants. These assets are appropriate for capital preservation and current income. Core-Plus (high income stability, high growth)—income-producing assets with identifiable upside drivers such as rent escalation, lease renewal, or modest

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...repositioning. These assets offer a blend of current income and capital appreciation potential. Value-Add (moderate income stability, high growth)—assets requiring active management, capital expenditure, or repositioning to unlock value. These assets offer higher potential returns but carry higher execution risk. Opportunistic (low income stability, high growth) —development, speculative, or distressed assets with significant upside potential but substantial risk. Appropriate only for investors with high risk tolerance and specialised capabilities.

Murivest's 2026 recommendation is to overweight Core and Core-Plus strategies, with selective Value-Add allocations in logistics and specialised real estate. Opportunistic investments should be limited to well-capitalised investors with development expertise and long hold periods.

17 — The Murivest 2026 Acquisition Universe

Based on its proprietary scoring and matrix, Murivest has identified the following categories as the most attractive acquisition opportunities for institutional capital in 2026:

• Logistics and Industrial: Modern warehousing and distribution centres along the Mombasa Road–Athi River corridor, cold chain facilities serving agricultural exports, and build-to-suit opportunities with creditworthy tenants.
• Prime Office: Grade A assets in Westlands and Upper Hill with strong tenant covenants, long leases, and institutional specifications.
• Neighbourhood Retail: Supermarket-anchored centres with strong foot traffic and essential services.
• Specialised Real Estate: Healthcare facilities, student accommodation, and data centres with long-term leases and strong demand drivers.

Murivest maintains a confidential database of vetted acquisition opportunities for qualified investors. Contact{' '} invest@murivest.com for more information.

18 — Absa Towers: Flagship Case Study

Absa Towers, located in Nairobi's CBD, represents a flagship institutional-grade office asset. The building is anchored by Absa Bank Kenya, a tier-one financial institution with a strong credit rating. With a WAULT of over 10 years and multiple other institutional tenants, the asset offers income stability and tenant quality that meet the highest institutional standards.

Murivest has analysed Absa Towers as a potential acquisition target for family office and institutional capital. The building's specifications, location, and tenant profile make it a Core asset under the Murivest Institutional Asset Quality Matrix. While the asset is not currently on the market, Murivest maintains relationships with key stakeholders and can facilitate introductions for qualified investors.

This case study illustrates the type of asset that institutional capital should target: income-producing, well-tenanted, professionally managed, and located in a prime submarket with structural demand drivers.

PART VI — FAMILY OFFICE STRATEGY

19 — How Family Office Capital May Move Through 2027

Family offices are uniquely positioned to navigate the 2027 election cycle. Their long time horizons, lower redemption pressure, and ability to negotiate directly give them advantages that institutional funds and retail investors lack.

Murivest's recommended approach for family offices is as follows:

• Maintain liquidity buffers: Ensure sufficient cash reserves to capitalise on opportunities that may arise during periods of heightened uncertainty.
• Pre-define acquisition thresholds: Establish clear criteria for when to deploy capital, including yield thresholds, tenant quality requirements, and location preferences.
• Build relationships with motivated sellers: Identify sellers who may need to transact before the election due to refinancing, portfolio rebalancing, or generational transitions.
• Focus on income-producing assets: Prioritise assets with strong tenant covenants and long leases over speculative or development-oriented opportunities.
• Consider structured partnerships: Joint ventures with professional managers or co-investments with other family offices can provide scale and diversification.

20 — What UHNW Investors Should Actually Buy

For UHNW investors, the key is to separate headlines from fundamentals. The market is filled with noise—election anxiety, interest rate speculation, currency volatility—but the fundamentals of income-producing real estate remain sound.

Murivest recommends that UHNW investors consider the following asset types:

• Logistics warehouses with long-term leases to multinational logistics operators or major retailers.
• Prime office buildings in Westlands or Upper Hill with a diversified tenant base and strong ESG credentials.
• Neighbourhood retail centres anchored by supermarket chains with strong covenants and long lease terms.
• Healthcare real estate with long-term leases to established hospital operators.
• Data centres with long-term contracts to major cloud providers or telecommunications companies.

These asset types offer income durability, inflation sensitivity, and downside protection that other asset classes cannot match. They are also scarce—there is limited supply of institutional-quality assets in these categories, and competition is increasing.

PART VII — MURIVEST

21 — From Property Brokerage to Capital Advisory

Murivest Group has evolved from a traditional property brokerage into a full-service capital advisory firm specialising in East African commercial real estate. Our services include:

• Asset sourcing and verification: We identify and underwrite acquisition opportunities that meet institutional standards.
• Due diligence and lease auditing: We verify tenant covenants, lease terms, and income streams to ensure accuracy and transparency.
• Transaction advisory: We negotiate and structure acquisitions, joint ventures, and financing arrangements.
• Asset management: We provide ongoing property management, lease administration, and performance reporting.
• Family office advisory: We help families professionalise their capital allocation and build institutional governance structures.

22 — The Murivest Investment Process

Our investment process is designed to bring rigour and transparency to every acquisition:

1. Sourcing: We identify opportunities through our extensive network of property owners, developers, and financial institutions.
2. Initial screening: We apply our proprietary scoring system to filter opportunities.
3. Due diligence: We conduct thorough financial, legal, and physical due diligence, including lease audits, tenant credit checks, and building inspections.
4. Underwriting: We prepare detailed financial models, including cash flow projections, sensitivity analyses, and scenario planning.
5. Investment committee review: All opportunities are reviewed by our investment committee, which includes independent experts.
6. Execution: We negotiate and close transactions, coordinating legal, tax, and financing advisors.
7. Asset management: We manage the asset post- acquisition, providing regular reporting and performance monitoring.

For more information, visit{' '} murivest.com or contact us at{' '} info@murivest.com.

PART VIII — OUTLOOK

23 — The Next Five Years

Looking beyond the 2027 election, Murivest's outlook for East African commercial real estate is cautiously optimistic. The region is experiencing structural trends—urbanisation, demographic growth, digitalisation, infrastructure investment—that will support demand for income-producing real estate over the long term.

Key themes for the next five years include:

• Institutionalisation: The market will continue to professionalise, with increased demand for transparent, governed, and liquid investment structures.
• Sustainability: ESG credentials will become a non-negotiable requirement for institutional tenants and investors.
• Technology: PropTech, data analytics, and smart building technologies will transform asset management and tenant engagement.
• Infrastructure: Continued investment in transport, energy, and digital infrastructure will create new real estate nodes and enhance existing ones.
• Regional integration: The East African Community will deepen, increasing cross-border trade and investment flows.

24 — What Could Change the Thesis?

No investment thesis is infallible. Murivest monitors the following risk factors that could alter the outlook for East African commercial real estate:

• Geopolitical shocks: Regional conflicts, sanctions, or global trade disruptions could weaken economic growth and tenant demand.
• Currency crisis: A significant depreciation of the shilling could erode foreign capital returns and increase the cost of imported inputs.
• Fiscal crisis: Kenya's high public debt levels could lead to fiscal consolidation measures that weaken economic growth.
• Climate change: Extreme weather events, particularly drought, could affect agricultural output and economic activity.
• Technology disruption: Remote work and e-commerce could continue to reshape demand for office and retail space.

Murivest regularly reviews these risk factors and adjusts its investment recommendations accordingly.

CONCLUSION

The New East African Investor

East Africa is not waiting for the rest of the world to decide its future. The region's entrepreneurs, family offices, and institutional investors are already building the capital structures, governance frameworks, and investment platforms that will define the next decade of commercial real estate.

The 2026 East Africa Capital Markets Report has argued that the most important shift is not in asset prices or interest rates, but in the behaviour of capital itself. The market is becoming more discerning, more professional, and more institutional. The assets that will attract this capital are those that meet the highest standards of income quality, tenant covenant, governance, and liquidity.

Murivest's role is to identify those assets, to connect them with the capital that should own them, and to help both sides navigate the complexities of East African commercial real estate. We believe that the next five years will be a period of significant opportunity for prepared investors.

The question is not whether to invest, but where—and with whom.

Murivest Group
murivest.com
info@murivest.com

APPENDICES

Sources & Methodology

This report draws on data from the Retirement Benefits Authority (RBA), Knight Frank, UNCTAD, Cytonn Investment, the Kenya Tourism Board, the Central Bank of Kenya, and publicly available financial reports. Murivest's proprietary scoring and matrix are based on internal models developed by our research team. All opinions are those of Murivest Group and are subject to change without notice.

Data Limitations

While Murivest has made every effort to ensure the accuracy and completeness of the information presented in this report, the commercial real estate data in East Africa is often incomplete or subject to revision. Transaction data is not always publicly available, and valuations may be based on appraisals rather than actual market transactions. Readers should exercise caution and conduct their own due diligence before making investment decisions.

Investment Disclaimer

This report does not constitute investment advice. It is for informational purposes only. Murivest Group does not guarantee the performance of any asset discussed in this report. All investments carry risk, and past performance is not indicative of future results. Qualified investors should consult with their financial, legal, and tax advisors before making any investment decisions.

About Murivest

Murivest Group is a capital advisory firm specialising in East African commercial real estate. We serve family offices, institutional investors, and UHNW individuals, providing sourcing, underwriting, transaction advisory, and asset management services. Our team combines local market knowledge with international institutional standards. For more information, visit{' '} murivest.com.